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Abstract—In this paper, a new pseudo-random number gen-
erator
(PRNG) based on chaotic iterations is proposed. This method
also combines the digits of two XORshifts PRNGs. The statistical
properties of this new generator are improved: the generated
sequences can pass all the DieHARD statistical test suite.
In addition, this generator behaves chaotically, as defined by
Devaney. This makes our generator suitable for cryptographic
applications. An illustration in the field of data hiding is pre-
sented and the robustness of the obtained data hiding algorithm
against attacks is evaluated.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) is an algo-
rithm for generating a sequence of numbers that is supposed
to be indistinguishable from a uniformly chosen random
sequence [7]. The sequence is not truly random in that it
is completely determined by a relatively small set of initial
values, called the PRNG’s seed. Compare to hardware-based
approaches, these PRNGs must be easy to generate and
process, but are less closer to truly random behavior. PRNGs
play an important role in practice for a whole range of ap-
plications such as information security, statistics (samplings,
simulations and Monte-Carlo techniques), video games and
gambling machines, to name a few [4]. These PRNGs are
often based on logical operations like bitwise exclusive or
(XOR) and on circular shift of bit vectors. XORshift, designed
by George Marsaglia [9], is a popular example of such
generators. However, the security level of some PRNGs of this
kind has been revealed to be inadequate by today’s standards.
We investigated whether it would be possible to combine two
generators in some way that would give better properties than
the individual components alone.
This paper extends the study started in [2] and [15]. In [2], it
is proven that chaotic iterations (CIs), a suitable tool for fast
computing iterative algorithms, satisfies the chaos property,
as it is defined by Devaney [3]. In [15], the chaotic behavior
of CIs are exploited in order to obtain an unpredictable
PRNG. This generator, based on chaotic iterations, depends
on two input sequences. In [15], these two sequences are
constituted by two logistic maps. This novel generator has
successfully passed the NIST (National Institute of Standards
and Technology of the U.S. Government) battery of tests [10].
In this new paper, we achieve to improve the speed of the
former PRNG, by using two XORshifts in place of the logistic
map. In addition, this new version of our PRNG is able to pass
the famous DieHARD statistical battery of tests [8]. And its
security is improved compared to XORshift alone, and to our
former PRNG. After presenting the theoretical framework of
the study, a concrete example of how to use these pseudo-
random numbers in the field of data hiding is detailed. An
analysis focuses on the watermarked images which have
already been subjected to common image distortion attacks.
It is shown that sequences generated from this generator have
a good robustness in the presence of such attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized in the following way: in
Section II, some basic definitions concerning chaotic iterations
and PRNGs are recalled. Then, the generator based on discrete
chaotic iterations is presented in Section III. In Section IV,
we show that the proposed PRNG passes the DieHARD
statistical tests. In Sections V and VI, there is a discussion
on a potential application scenario to watermarking. Finally,
some conclusions and future work are drawn in Section VII.
II. BASIC RECALLS
This section is devoted to basic notations and terminologies
in the fields of chaotic iterations and PRNGs.
A. Notations
J1;NK → {1, 2, . . . , N}
sn → the nth term of a sequence s = (s1, s2, . . .)
vi → the ith component of an array v = (v1, v2, . . .)
fk → kth composition of a function f
fk = f ◦ ... ◦ f︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
strategy → a sequence which elements belong in J1;NK
S → the set of all strategies
⊕ → bitwise exclusive or
+ → the integer addition
≪ and ≫→ the usual shift operators
B. Chaotic iterations
Definition 1 The set B denoting {0, 1}, let f : BN −→ BN
be an “iteration” function and S ∈ S be a chaotic strategy.
Then, the so-called chaotic iterations are defined by
x0 ∈ BN,
∀n ∈ N∗, ∀i ∈ J1;NK, xn
i
=
{
xn−1
i
if Sn 6= i
f(xn−1)Sn if Sn = i.
(1)
In other words, at the nth iteration, only the Sn−th cell is
“iterated”. Note that in a more general formulation, Sn can
be a subset of components and f(xn−1)Sn can be replaced by
f(xk)Sn (where k < n), thus describing for example, delays
due to transmissions (see e.g. [1]). For the general definition
of such chaotic iterations, see, e.g. [11].
Input: x (a 32-bit word)
Output: r (a 32-bit word)
x← x⊕ (x≪ 13);
x← x⊕ (x≫ 17);
x← x⊕ (x≪ 5);
r ← x;
return r;
An arbitrary round of XORshift
Table I: XORshift and CI algorithms
Chaotic iterations generate a set of vectors (boolean vector in
this paper), they are defined by an initial state x0, an iteration
function f and a chaotic strategy S.
C. XORshift
XORshift is a category of very fast PRNGs designed by
George Marsaglia [9]. It repeatedly uses the exclusive or
(XOR) on a number, with a bit shifted copy of itself by a
positions either to the right or to the left, where 0 < a < w
and w = 32 or 64. The initial state of a XORshift generator is
a given vector of bits. At each step, the next state is obtained
by applying a given number of XORshift operations as defined
in Table I. This algorithm has a period of 232−1 = 4.29×109.
D. Input sequences
In [15], we have used two logistic maps [14] as input
sequences to define a novel PRNG (called CI PRNG) based
on chaotic iterations. We have mathematically proven that it
behaves chaotically, as defined by Devaney. In addition, this
generator can successfully pass the NIST tests suite. However,
chaotic systems like logistic maps work in the real numbers
domain, and therefore a transformation from real numbers into
integers is needed. This process leads to a degradation of the
chaotic behavior of the generator and a lot of time wasted
during computations [5]. Our purpose is then to improve the
speed of this former generator and grant its chaotic properties
by using a faster PRNG, namely XORshift. Moreover, we will
show in Section IV-B that this new generator can pass the
famous DieHARD battery of tests.
III. THE GENERATION OF CI PSEUDO-RANDOM SEQUENCE
The design of the PRNG based on discrete chaotic iterations
is proposed in this section, while its performance is evaluated
in the next one.
A. Chaotic iterations as PRNG
The novel generator is designed by the following pro-
cess. Let N ∈ N∗,N > 2. Some chaotic iterations
are done, which generate a sequence (xn)
n∈N
∈
(
B
N
)N
of boolean vectors: the successive states of the iterated
system. Some of those vectors are chaotically extracted
and their components constitute our pseudo-random bit
flow. Chaotic iterations are realized as follows: initial state
x0 ∈ BN is a boolean vector taken as a seed and chaotic
strategy (Sn)
n∈N
∈ J1,NKN is constructed with XORshift.
Lastly, iterate function f is the vectorial boolean negation
f0 : (x1, ..., xN) ∈ B
N 7−→ (x1, ..., xN) ∈ B
N.
Input: the internal state x
(x is an array of N 1-bit words)
Output: an array r of N 1-bit words
a← XORshift1();
m← a mod 2 + c
for i = 0, . . . ,m do
b← XORshift2();
S ← b mod N;
xS ← xS ;
end for
r ← x;
return r;
An arbitrary round of CI generator
Table II: CI algorithms
To sum up, at each iteration, only Si-th component of state
xn is updated as follows
xni =


xn−1
i
if i 6= Si,
xn−1
i
if i = Si.
(2)
Finally, let M be a finite subset of N∗. Some xn are selected
by a sequence mn as the pseudo-random bit sequence of our
generator. The sequence (mn)n∈N ∈ MN is computed with
XORshift. So, the generator returns the following values:
• the components of xm0 ,
• following by the components of xm0+m1 ,
• following by the components of xm0+m1+m2 ,
• etc.
In other words, the generator returns the following bits:
x
m0
1 x
m0
2 x
m0
3 . . . x
m0
N
x
m0+m1
1 x
m0+m1
2 . . . x
m0+m1
N
x
m0+m1+m2
1 x
m0+m1+m2
2 . . .
and its kth bit is equal to
x
∑⌊k/N⌋
i=0 mi
k+1 (mod N).
The basic design procedure of the novel generator is summed
up in Table II. The internal state is x, the output array is r;
a and b are those computed by the two XORshift generators.
Lastly, c and N are constants and M = {c,c+1} (c > 3N is
recommended).
B. Example
In this example, N = 5 and M = {4,5} are adopted
for easy understanding. The initial state of the system x0
can be seeded by the decimal part of the current time. For
example, the current time in seconds since the Epoch is
1237632934.484084, so t = 484084. x0 = t (mod 32) in
binary digits, then x0 = (1, 0, 1, 0, 0). m and S can now be
computed from two XORshift PRNGs:
m = 4, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 5, 4,...
S = 2, 4, 2, 2, 5, 1, 1, 5, 5, 3, 2, 3, 3,...
Chaotic iterations are made with initial state x0, vectorial
logical negation f0 and strategy S. The result is presented in
Table III. Let us recall that sequence m gives the states xn
to return: x4, x4+5, x4+5+4, . . .
So, in this example, the output of the generator is:
10100111101111110011...
C. Chaotic properties
Despite a large number of papers published in the field of
chaos-based PRNGs, the impact that this research has made
on conventional information security is rather marginal. This
Table III: Application example
m : 4 5 4
S 2 4 2 2 5 1 1 5 5 3 2 3 3
x0 x4 x9 x13
1 1 1−→ 0 1−→ 1 1 1
0 2−→ 1 2−→ 0 2−→ 1 1 1 2−→ 0 0
1 1 1 3−→ 0 3−→ 1 3−→ 0 0
0 4−→ 1 1 1 1
0 0 5−→ 1 5−→ 0 5−→ 1 1 1
Output: x0
1
x0
2
x0
3
x0
4
x0
5
x4
1
x4
2
x4
3
x4
4
x4
5
x9
1
x9
2
x9
3
x9
4
x9
5
x13
1
x13
2
x13
3
x13
4
x13
5
... = 10100111101111110011...
is due to the following reasons: almost all chaotic algorithms
are based on dynamical systems defined on the set of real
numbers. So these generators are usually slow, require con-
siderably more storage space and lose some of their chaotic
properties during computations. These major problems restrict
their use in security fields as cryptography [6].
The PRNG proposed in this paper does not inherit its chaotic
properties from a real chaotic map, but from chaotic iterations
defined in Section II-B. It has been proven in [2] that CIs
behave as chaos, as it is defined by Devaney: they are
regular, transitive and sensitive to initial conditions. This most
famous definition of chaotic behavior for a dynamical system
implies various desired properties in information security,
such as: unpredictability, mixture, sensitivity, and uniform
repartition. The principal interest of CIs is that they can be
used without real numbers. Indeed, the sequence inputed in
chaotic iterations constitutes a coordinate of its initial state,
and the chaotic behavior of a dynamical system does not
depend on this initial state. So if we take integer sequences
as input instead, then CIs become faster while preserving
their chaotic properties. This allows the conception of a new
generation of fast and chaotic PRNGs
IV. TESTING A GENERATOR
Here, the empirical tests have been carried out, making use
of the DieHARD statistical test suite. In this section we will
briefly review the approach taken together with key results
and conclusions. It is not our intention to document these
tests in detail in the present section, since it has been done
several times in many other papers [8],[12],[13].
A. DieHARD battery of tests
DieHARD battery of tests has been a stringent standard
for evaluating PRNGs for over a decade. Passing this battery
is considered as a good rule of thumb to validate a PRNG.
DieHARD battery consists of 18 different independent sta-
tistical tests. This collection of tests is based on assessing
the randomness of bits comprising 32-bit integers obtained
from a random number generator. Each test requires 223 32-
bit integers in order to run the full set of tests.
Most of the tests in DieHARD return a p−value, which should
be uniform on [0, 1) if the input file contains truly independent
random bits. Those p−values are obtained by p = F (X),
where F is the assumed distribution of the sample random
variable X–often supposed as normal distribution. But that
assumed F is just an asymptotic approximation, for which
the fit will be worst in the tails. Thus occasional p−values
Table IV: Results of DieHARD battery of tests
No. Test name Generators
XORshift PRNG (Chaotic iterations)
1 Overlapping Sum Pass Pass
2 Runs Up 1 Pass Pass
Runs Down 1 Pass Pass
Runs Up 2 Pass Pass
Runs Down 2 Pass Pass
3 3D Spheres Pass Pass
4 Parking Lot Pass Pass
5 Birthday Spacing Pass Pass
6 Count the ones 1 Fail Pass
7 Binary Rank 6× 8 Pass Pass
8 Binary Rank 31× 31 Fail Pass
9 Binary Rank 32× 32 Fail Pass
10 Count the ones 2 Pass Pass
11 Bit Stream Pass Pass
12 Craps Wins Pass Pass
Throws Pass Pass
13 Minimum Distance Pass Pass
14 Overlapping Perm. Pass Pass
15 Squeeze Pass Pass
16 OPSO Pass Pass
17 OQSO Pass Pass
18 DNA Pass Pass
Number of tests passed 15 18
near 0 or 1, such as 0.0012 or 0.9983, are not surprising.
An individual test is considered to be a failure if its p−value
approaches 1 more closely, for example p > 0.9999.
B. Analysis
Table IV gives the results derived from applying the
DieHARD battery of tests to the RNGs considered in this
work. As it can be observed, the results of the individual
tests Count the ones 1, Binary Rank 31 × 31 and Binary
Rank 32 × 32 show that in the random numbers obtained
with the XORshift generator only the least significant bits
seem to be independent. This explains the poor behavior of
this RNG in the aforementioned basic tests that evaluate the
independence of real numbers. But the generator based on
discrete chaotic iterations can pass all the DieHARD battery
of tests. This proves that the security of the given generator
has been improved by CIs.
V. APPLICATION EXAMPLE IN DIGITAL WATERMARKING
Information hiding has recently become a major informa-
tion security technology, especially with the increasing impor-
tance and widespread distribution of digital media through
the Internet [16]. It includes several techniques like digital
watermarking. The aim of digital watermarking is to embed
a piece of information into digital documents, such as pic-
tures or movies. This is for a large panel of reasons, such
as: copyright protection, control utilization, data description,
content authentication, and data integrity. For these reasons,
many different watermarking schemes have been proposed
in recent years. Digital watermarking must have essential
characteristics, including: security, imperceptibility, and ro-
bustness. Chaotic methods have been proposed to encrypt the
watermark before embedding it in the carrier image for these
security reasons. In this paper, a new watermarking algorithm
is given. It is based on the chaotic PRNG presented above.
A. Most and least significant coefficients
Let us first introduce the definitions of most and least
significant coefficients.
Definition 2 For a given image, the most significant co-
efficients (in short MSCs), are coefficients that allow the
description of the relevant part of the image, i.e. its most rich
part (in terms of embedding information), through a sequence
of bits.
For example, in a spatial description of a grayscale image, a
definition of MSCs can be the sequence constituted by the first
three bits of each pixel as shown in Figure 1(a). In a discrete
cosine frequency domain description, each 8× 8 block of the
carrier image is mapped to a list of 64 coefficients. The energy
of the image is contained in the first of them. After binary
conversion, the first fourth coefficients of all these blocks can
constitute a possible sequence of MSCs.
Definition 3 By least significant coefficients (LSCs), we
mean a translation of some insignificant parts of a medium in
a sequence of bits (insignificant can be understand as: “which
can be altered without sensitive damages”).
These LSCs can be for example, the last three bits of the
gray level of each pixel, in the case of a spatial domain
watermarking of a grayscale image, as in Figure 1(b).
(a) MSCs of Lena (b) LSCs of Lena
Figure 1. Spatial MSCs and LSCs of Lena.
Discrete cosine, Fourier, and wavelet transform can be used
to define LSCs and MSCs, in the case of frequency domain
watermarking, among other possible choices. Moreover, these
definitions are not limited to image media, but can easily be
extended to the audio and video media as well.
LSCs are used during the embedding stage: some of the least
significant coefficients of the carrier image will be chaotically
chosen and replaced by the bits of the mixed watermark. With
a large number of LSCs, the watermark can be inserted more
than once and thus the embedding will be more secure and
robust, but also more detectable.
The MSCs are only useful in the case of authentication:
encryption and embedding stages depend on them. Hence, a
coefficient should not be defined at the same time, as a MSC
and a LSC; the last can be altered, while the first is needed
to extract the watermark.
B. Stages of the algorithm
Our watermarking scheme consists of two stages: (1) mix-
ture of the watermark and (2) its embedding.
1) Watermark mixture.: Firstly, for safety reasons, the
watermark can be mixed before its embedding into the image.
A common way to achieve this stage is to use the bitwise
exclusive or (XOR), for example, between the watermark and
the above PRNG. In this paper, we will use another mixture
scheme based on chaotic iterations. Its chaotic strategy, de-
fined with our PRNG, will be highly sensitive to the MSCs,
in the case of an authenticated watermark, as stated in [2].
2) Watermark embedding.: Some LSCs will be substituted
by all bits of the possibly mixed watermark. To choose the
sequence of LSCs to be altered, a number of integers, less
than or equal to the number N of LSCs corresponding to
a chaotic sequence
(
Uk
)
k
, is generated from the chaotic
strategy used in the mixture stage. Thus, the Uk-th least
significant coefficient of the carrier image is substituted by
the kth bit of the possibly mixed watermark. In the case of
authentication, such a procedure leads to a choice of the LSCs
which are highly dependent on the MSCs. For the detail of
this stage see Section VI-A2.
3) Extraction.: The chaotic strategy can be regenerated,
even in the case of an authenticated watermarking because the
MSCs have not been changed during the stage of embedding
the watermark. Thus, the few altered LSCs can be found,
the mixed watermark can then be rebuilt, and the original
watermark can be obtained. If the watermarked image is
attacked, then the MSCs will change. Consequently, in the
case of authentication and due to the high sensitivity of
the embedding sequence, the LSCs designed to receive the
watermark will be completely different. Hence, the result
of the recovery will have no similarity with the original
watermark: authentication is reached.
VI. EVALUATION OF ROBUSTNESS
In this section, a complete application example of the above
chaotic watermarking method is given and its robustness to
some attacks is studied. This case study enables us to precise
the details of the algorithm and evaluate it.
A. Stages and details
1) Images description.: Carrier image is Lena, a 256
grayscale image of size 256 × 256. The watermark is the
64 × 64 pixels binary image depicted in Figure 2(a). The
embedding domain will be the spatial domain. The selected
MSCs are the four most significant bits of each pixel and the
LSCs are the three last bits (a given pixel will at most be
modified of four levels of gray by an iteration). Before its
embedment, the watermark is mixed with chaotic iterations.
The system to iterate, chaotic strategy Sn and iterate function
are defined below.
(a)Watermark
(b)Watermarked Lena (c)Differences with original.
Figure 2. Watermarked Lena and differences
2) Embedding of the watermark.: To embed the water-
mark, the sequence (Uk)k∈N of altered bits taken from the
M LSCs must be defined. To do so, the strategy (Sk)k∈N of
the encryption stage is used as follows{
U0 = S0
Un+1 = Sn+1 + 2× Un + n (mod M)
(3)
to obtain the result depicted in Figure 2(b). The map θ 7→ 2θ
of the torus, which is a famous example of topological De-
vaney’s chaos [3], has been chosen to make (Uk)k∈N highly
sensitive to the chaotic strategy (Sk)k∈N. As a consequence,
(Uk)k∈N is highly sensitive to the alteration of the MSCs.
In case of authentication, any significant modification of
the watermarked image will lead to a completely different
extracted watermark.
B. Simulation results
To prove the efficiency and the robustness of the proposed
algorithm, some attacks are applied to our chaotically water-
marked image. For each attack, a similarity percentage with
the original watermark is computed. This percentage is the
number of equal bits between the original and the extracted
watermark, shown as a percentage. A result less than or
equal to 50% implies that the image has probably not been
watermarked.
1) Cropping attack.: In this kind of attack, a watermarked
image is cropped. In this case, the results in Table V have
been obtained.
In Figure 3, the decrypted watermarks are shown after
a crop of 50 pixels and after a crop of 10 pixels, in the
authentication case.
(a)Unauthentication (10× 10) (b)Authentication(10× 10)
(c)Unauthentication (50× 50)
Figure 3. Extracted watermark after a cropping attack.
By analyzing the similarity percentage between the original
and the extracted watermark, we can conclude that in the
Table V: Attacks
Attacks UNAUTHENTICATION AUTHENTICATION
Cr
o
pp
in
g Size (pixels) Similarity Size (pixels) Similarity
10 99.48% 10 49.68%
50 97.63% 50 54.54%
100 91.31% 100 52.24%
200 68.56% 200 51.87%
R
o
ta
tio
n
Angle (degree) Similarity Angle (degree) Similarity
2 97.41% 2 70.01%
5 94.67% 5 59.47%
10 91.30% 10 54.51%
25 80.85% 25 50.21%
JP
EG
co
m
pr
es
sio
n
Compression Similarity Compression Similarity
2 82.95% 2 54.39%
5 65.23% 5 53.46%
10 60.22% 10 50.14%
20 53.17% 20 48.80%
G
au
ss
ia
n
n
o
ise
Standard dev. Similarity Standard dev. Similarity
1 74.26% 1 52.05%
2 63.33% 2 50.95%
3 57.44% 3 49.65%
case of unauthentication, the watermark still remains after a
cropping attack. The desired robustness is reached. It can
be noticed that cropping sizes and percentages are rather
proportional. In the case of authentication, even a small
change of the carrier image (a crop by 10× 10 pixels) leads
to a really different extracted watermark. In this case, any
attempt to alter the carrier image will be signaled, thus the
image is well authenticated.
2) Rotation attack.: Let rθ be the rotation of angle θ
around the center (128, 128) of the carrier image. So, the
transformation r−θ ◦ rθ is applied to the watermarked image.
The results in Table V have been obtained. The same conclu-
sion as above can be declaimed.
3) JPEG compression.: A JPEG compression is applied to
the watermarked image, depending on a compression level.
This attack leads to a change of the representation domain
(from spatial to DCT domain). In this case, the results in
Table V have been obtained, illustrating a good authentication
through JPEG attack. As for the unauthentication case, the
watermark still remains after a compression level equal to 10.
This is a good result if we take into account the fact that we
use spatial embedding.
4) Gaussian noise.: A watermarked image can be also
attacked by the addition of a Gaussian noise, depending on
a standard deviation. In this case, the results in Table V are
obtained.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, the PRNG proposed in [15] is improved,
by using the famous XORshift generator. By combining
these components with chaotic iterations, we define a faster
generator with chaotic properties. In addition to achieving
the NIST tests suite, this new generator successfully passes
all the stringent DieHARD battery of tests. The randomness
and disorder generated by this algorithm has been evaluated.
It offers a sufficient level of security for a whole range of
computer usages. An application example in the field of data
hiding is given and its robustness through attacks is studied.
In future work, the speed of our generator will be improved
again, the comparison of different chaotic strategies will be
explored, and other iteration functions will be studied. Finally,
new applications in computer science security field will be
proposed.
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